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Supply of and demand for deposits
The supply ofdeposits to the regulated
financial sector is responsive to the differen-
tial between the rate ofreturn on deposits
and returns onunregulated alternatives such
as Treasury securities. A fall in the rates on
alternative investments reduces their attrac-
tiveness compared to deposits, and leads to
an inflow offunds to depository institutions.
Similarly, an increase in their rates causes
depository institutionsto lose deposits as the
alternative investments become more
attractive. For example, banks and thrifts
were particularly hard hit bydeposit out-
The conventional wisdom that loan rates
will rise because ofderegulation ignores a
general principle of microeconomics: In a
competitive industry, binding price controls
can lead to a redistribution of income, but
they cannot increase, and usually decrease,
the quantities ofscarce goods available. In
the financial sector, regulation would
reduce the supplyoffunds available to
banksand thrifts ifthe effective rate ofreturn
on deposits were kept artificially low. As a
result, depository institutions had to use
other more costly ways tocompensate
depositors in order to attract additional
funds, had to charge their loan customers
higher loan rates to ration the restricted
supply offunds, orboth. Thus, regulation
did notmake morefunds aVai lable to lend,
and did not reduce the cost ofattracting
additional funds. By the same token, deregu-
lation should notbeexpectedto increase the
marginal cost offunds or reduce their
quantity. Deregulation will not lead to an
increase in loan rates.
cost ofattracting an additional dollar of
deposits, that determines the interest rates
that financial institutionscharge on loans.
Second, the interest cost of.additional funds
is justone componentoftheir marginal cost.
Finally, deregulation will not increase and
maylower the marginal cost ofdeposits.
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Interest-Rate Deregulation·
Is the conventional wisdom wrong?
Many analysts believe that interest-rate
deregulationwill lead to higher interest rates
for borrowers because it will increase the
average interest cost offunds to banks and
thrifts. For example, recent articles in The
Wall Street Journal (November 7, 1983) and
Business Week (November 28, 1983) claim
that interest-rate deregulation has built at
least a one percentage point increase into
the structure of loan rates, and that deregu-
lation means an end to artificially low rates
on mortgages and other consumer loans.
The reasoning behind this claim apparently
is that the higher interest costs banks and
thrifts will have to pay for their funds will be
passed on totheirloan customers. However,
this argument ignores three points. First, it is
the marginalcost, i.e., the total incremental
Recently, interest-rate restrictions on most
depositaccounts at banks and thrifts were
eliminated. With the introduction ofMoney
Market Deposit Accounts (MMDAs) and
Super-NOWs, interest-rate ceilings on
short-term deposits(in excess of$2500) were
effectively eliminated. Further, the October
1 deregulationoftime deposits with matur-
ities of32 days to 21f2 years has completed
the deregulation ofrates on long-term
accounts. Although some interest-rate
ceiIings and other restrictions still exist (for
example, interest-rate ceilings on passbook
savings and NOWaccounts), the interest
rates that banks and thrifts can pay to attract
funds are now largely unregulated and will
be determined by market forces. Although
the magnitude of the economic impactof
interest-ratederegulation may notbe known
for years, it is likely that deposit rates will be
higher. However, contrary to conventional
wisdom, higherdepositrates will not lead to
higherloan rates and loan rates mayeven be
somewhat lowerthan they wouId have been
without deregulation. This Letter discusses
why interest-ratederegulation is expected to
have these effects.
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flows in 1981 whenthe T-bill rate rose to 17
percent.
Evidence on the interest-rate sensitivity of
regulated deposits is presented in Chart 1
where the percent oftotal bank and thrift
deposits accounted for by passbook savings
accounts is compared to the 3-month T-bill
rate (a market-determined rate). This chart
shows that when marketrates rise, passbook
savings fall as a percentoftotal deposits.
This inverse relationship has been particu-
larly strong since 1978 when money market
mutual funds became widely accepted. The
rise in market interest rates since 1977 has
led to a steep decline in passbook savings
from almost 40 percent oftotal deposits in
1977 to less than 20 percent in 1982. In
absoluteterms, passbook savings have
fallen from about $500 billion in 1978 to
less than $350 billion in 1982.
The demand by banks and thrifts for deposit
funds is negatively related to the marginat
cost ofthese funds because higher marginal
costs mean higherinterestrates fortheir loan
customers, who in turn cut back on the
amountthey are willingto borrow. In the
absenceofdeposit-rateregulation, the inter-
action ofthe supplyofand demand for
deposits would determinethe rate paid on
them and the quantity attracted by deposi-
tory institutions.
In contrast, a binding deposit-rate ceiling
(which could notbe circumvented), by
loweringthe rate paid on deposits, would
reduce the quantityofdeposits the public
was willing to supply to banks and thrifts. A
smallerquantity offunds supplied would
mean an artificial shortage offunds to lend,
Borrowers from banks andthrifts in turn
would bewillingtopay higher rates in order
to get part ofthe smaller supply offunds.
Thus, binding interesHateceilings, by rais-
ing loan rates and at the same time lowering
depositrates, wouId create apowerful profit
incentiveforbanks and thrifts tocompete for
additional funds by circumventing the
ceilings.
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Were the ceilings circumvented?
Regu lated financial institutions in factdevel-
opedtwo importantmeansofcircumventing
interest-rate ceilings. Oneway was to offer
extra "non-priced" services, such as longer
business hours, more branches, and "free"
checking.accounts. The other way was to
attract deposits in the form of large-
denomination ($100,000) CDs (which have
not been subject to interest-rate ceilings
since the early 19705).
Some non-priced services wouId be offered
even in the absence ofregulation becauseof
tax considerations and the costs involved in
chargingfor some services. However, it is
likelythat the quantity of non-priced
services offered under regulation exceeded
what banks and thrifts would offer in the
absenceofregulation. For example, Bank of
America recently announceditwill close
120branches and many banks are now
chargingfor services that were previously
free. In addition, financial institutions have
shifted dramaticallyto using interest rates to
compete for deposits since deregulation by
offering, for example, high rates on Money
Market Deposit Accounts. This suggests that
offeringnon-priced services was a relatively
costly way to compete, and that, as a result,
the costofattracting additional funds was
higher under regulation, Ifinterest-rate
competition were not a·Iess costly way of
attracting deposits, financial institutions
would not have shifted so dramaticallyfrom
non-price to price competition.
The fact that deregulation has led to reduc-
tions in non-priced'servicesand increases in
deposit rates means that at least some ofthe
non-pricecompetition was sociallywasteful
- that the cost ofproviding these services
exceeded the value that the depositors
placed on them. Deregulation, byeliminat-
ing this waste, will benefitboth depositors
and loan customers.
However, the divergence between market
rates and interest-rate ceilings varies over
the business cycle. Thus, since it is difficultI , I t I
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Conclusions
Regu lation had the effect ofIimiting the
ability ofbanks and thrifts to perform their
valuableeconomic function as financial
intermediaries by limitingtheirabilityto use
deposit-rate competition to attract deposits.
With deregulation, the competition for
depositswill be moreefficientbecause regu-
lated institutions wiII be free to compete
using price, i.e., deposit interest rates.
Consequently, rates paid on deposits that
werepreviouslyregu latedwill be higherand
more funds will be attracted to regulated
financial intermediaries. These higher
deposit rates, however,. will not lead to
higher loan rates, and loan rates may even
besomewhatlower. In addition, the socially
wastefuI non-price competition among
financial institutions dueto interest-rate
regulation will be eliminated and funds will
be more efficiently allocated to borrowers.
Thus, deregulation will have important
benefits for both savers and borrowers as
well as for the economy as a whole.
Michael C. Keeley
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To illustrate that loan rates have historically
depended on the marginal cost of loanable
funds and noton statutory rates on deposits,
Chart 2 plots the prime rate on commercial
loans, the 3-month CD rate, which approxi-
mates the marginal costofdeposits, and the
passbook ceiling rate. This chartshows that
the prime rate and the CD rate move
together very closely. Ifthe interest rate on
loans were primarily determined bythe reg-
ulated depositrate, wewouldnotexpectthe
loan rate to be so closely correlated with a
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Lower marginal costs
Sinceboth ofthese meansfor circumventing
interest-rate ceilings were probably more
costly than interest-rate competition, dereg-
ulationwill certainly notraise and mayeven
lowerthe marginal cost ofraising funds.
Since the marginal cost offunds determines
the rate charged for loans, the loan rate also
"",i II not increase and maydecrease some-
what underderegulation. How large this
effect will be is an empirical question.
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to vary the provisionsofnon-priced services
to match rapid changes in market rates,
other methods of circumventing interest-
rate ceilings would be needed during some
parts ofthe business cycle. Large CDs were
justsuch amethod. Large banks widelyused
large CDs to circumvent interest-rate ceil-
ings, although small banks and thrifts were
tess able to tap this market. Since there have
been no interest-rate ceilings on these
accounts since the early 19705, financial
institutions could use interest-rate competi-
tion to attract these types ofdeposits.
However, it is Iikely that the marginal costs
ofsuch funds were higherbecause ofregula-
tion. Onereason is thatsince the late 1970s,
money market mutual funds were an impor-
tant conduit forsmalLdeposits that were
aggregated and then invested in large CDs.
However, the transactions costs ofconsoli-
dating funds that would have been deposi-
ted in banks in the absence ofinterest-rate
ceilings and then depositing them in banks
asCDs mustbe largerthan havingthe banks
directly attract such funds by paying market
rates. The fact that the fraction oftotal
deposits in CDs has declined after deregula-
tion supports this hypothesis.SSV10 .LSl:Il::l
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loans(gross, adjusted) and investments* 165,522 186 1,228 0.7
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 145,328 167 2,183 1.5
Commercial and industrial 44,261 294 - 1,556 - 3.4
Real estate 57,801 58 713 1.2
loans to individuals 25,967 252 1,958 8.2
Securities loans 3,470 116 643 22.7
U:S. Treasury securities" 7,821 - 26 814 11:6
Other securities" 12,371 45 - 1,768 - 12.5
.Demand deposits - totaJ# 45,098
I
1,679 1,959 4.5
Demand deposits - adjusted 30,355 301 629 2.1
Savings deposits - totalt 65,937 - 91 21,444 48.2
Timedeposits - total# 70,404 - 78 - 18,219 - 20.6
Individuals, part. & corp. 64,321 - 118 - 14,352 - 18.2
(Large negotiable CD's) 17,319 - 170 - 13,184 - A3.2
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves (+)JDeficiency (-)
Borrowings
















.. Excludes trading account seCUrities.
# Includes items notshown separately.
t Includes MoneyMarket Deposit Accounts, Super-NOWaccounts, and NOWaccounts.
Editorial commentsmay beaddressed to the editor(GregoryTong)ortotheauthor....Freecopiesof
this arK! other Federal Reserve publications can be obtained by calling orwriting the Public Informa·
tionSection, Federal Reserve 8ankofSan Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco 94120. Phone (41 5)
974·2246.